Partisanship and the party system by Pierce, Roy & Converse, Philip E.
Political Behavior, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1992 
PARTISANSHIP AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 
Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce 
The defining properties of party identification long established for the United States fail 
with some frequency to be replicated in electoral systems abroad. A number of plausible 
suggestions have been made to account for this system-level variability: Most of these 
have some lace merit, but none taken alone is adequate to provide a full cross-system 
explanation. Variation in party system size or fractionallzation has recently been dis- 
cussed as another source of differential dynamics of party- loyalties. Unfortunately, the 
conventional means of assessing party identification properties are subject to rather se- 
vere artifacts, typically ignored, when comparisons are made across systems of very dif- 
ferent party, size. The conceptual stakes underlying key methods options for such compar- 
isons-most notably, between continuous and discrete statistical tools--are examined. The 
use of continuous statistics for systems of very multiple parties rests on an assumption 
that voters do in some degree regard these party systems as imbedded in a continuous 
space. A simple test for this assumption is mounted in four systems and unsurprisingly it 
shows very clear support. Analysis of residuals beyond this obvious result add several 
points of less obvious information about the distribution of party affect in such systems. 
Students  of  electoral politics have long focused on the role of  psychologi- 
cal a t tachments  to political parties in accounting for key aspects of  continu- 
ity and change in voter  preferences.  Within  the context of  the Uni ted 
States, a p h e n o m e n o n  of  par ty  identification was invoked to account  for the 
fact that voters repor ted  defecting from their generally preferred party in 
the short  run, but  t ended  to re turn "home" to it after such defections at 
rates greatly beyond  chance (Campbel] et al., 1960). These party loyalties, 
once formed,  are not  immutable:  They  may be constantly updated around 
the edges to reflect assessments of  party performance on the current  scene 
(Brody, 1977b; Brody and Rothenberg,  1988; Fiorina, 1981). But for most 
voters most  of  the time, the predominant  causal flow is from partisan 
at tachments  to other  more  specific political sentiments,  including vote 
choices, rather  than the reverse. Such identifications in the Uni ted States 
are more  stable than vote partisanship. Thus, when the s tudent  of  Ameri-  
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can elections needs an analytic variable that is both potent and relatively 
exogenous, at least for short-run uses, it is hard to find anything that even 
seriously competes with a measure of party identification. 
For democratic systems abroad, however, the story may be quite differ- 
ent. Initially in the 1960s scholars in Europe and elsewhere seized upon 
the party identification concept for uses in their own electoral studies. This 
interest turned to disillusionment in some countries, however, when it was 
discovered that certain key dynamic features of party identification as dem- 
onstrated for the United States could not be replicated locally (e.g., Budge, 
Crewe, and Farlie, 1976). Actually, the situation was one step more frustrat- 
ing, in that some glints looking like the American identification phenome- 
non appeared everywhere, but they were often different glints. ~ Disillu- 
sionment reached its peak with evidence that in certain systems, most no- 
tably the Netherlands, voter testimony about party loyalties was if anything 
less stable than party choice at the polls, and in any event it seemed to 
arise as a post hoc adjustment after a shift in vote choice (Thomassen, 1976). 
It is not, of course, surprising to find that party identification dynamics 
show some cross-system variability. Indeed, in the first extended descrip- 
tion of the phenomenon it was shown inter alia that even within the United 
States such identifications were more strongly developed in states that offi- 
cially required voters to declare a generic party of preference than in those 
with no such electoral requirement (Campbell et al., 1960). Nonetheless, 
party identification dynamics are seen to pivot in some degree on such 
basic psychological processes as the need for simple cues to help order a 
complex reality, and curves of social learning. These are not, presumably, 
phenomena that are present in some cultures but not in others. 
The purpose of this paper is to continue reporting on a series of investi- 
gations that we have carried out in recent years, designed to make broader 
sense of the cross-national evidence concerning party identification. Data 
archives now enjoy an abundance of electoral surveys worldwide with one 
or another version of a partisanship measure. Given our immediate pur- 
poses, we are unable to harness all of this empirical richness here. We 
must restriet our empirical work to those studies in the archives with ap- 
propriate party identification measures carried out on representative na- 
tional samples followed longitudinally. 2 It is the longitudinal criterion that 
eliminates the vast majority of archived electoral studies, but we must hew 
to this stipulation because we are interested in the dynamics of partisanship 
over time. 
SYSTEM VARIATION IN PARTISANSHIP: SUGGESTED SOURCES 
Numerous studies of cross-national variation in the apparent workings of 
partisanship are frankly descriptive, intended merely to document that sys- 
tem differences exist in these regards. Some studies, however, attempt to 
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explain post hoe why empirical studies have shown "unusual" patterns in 
this or that polity. It is worth beginning with a brief review of some of 
these suggestions. 
As always, in confronting discrepant results it is useful to consider the 
possibility of methods artifacts before engaging in strenuous theorizing 
about the meaning of observed differences. Early on, for example, it be- 
came clear that some evidence of anomalies from abroad was suspect be- 
cause inferences about dynamic properties were being made from data col- 
lections at a single point in time. In an earlier paper in this series we also 
noted that other points of apparent failure to replicate American patterns 
were based on measures of short-term affect toward political parties that 
bore little resemblance to the conventional party identification measure 
(Converse and Pierce, 1985). Discarding results from nonequivalent meth- 
odologies has helped somewhat to shrink the range of apparent anomalies, 
although it has fallen far short of resolving them away. 
Beyond this methodological brush-clearing, more substantive explana- 
tions for cross-national differences have hinged on contrasts in electoral 
system properties. For example, Butler and Stokes (1969), noting that Brit- 
ish voters seemed less likely than Americans to express a sense of abiding 
partisanship even when changing a vote to another party, linked the con- 
trast to differences in the normal task voters face at the polls in the two 
countries. The American voter, confronting a ballot requiring selection of 
many candidates at multiple levels of office, can align many decisions at 
once by saying, "I am basically a Democrat, although now and again I can 
be lured into voting for an especially attractive Republican." Such a state- 
ment recognizes a primary identity and a grounds for occasional defection. 
British voters, asked to vote but once at one level, may feel it odd or 
inconsistent to report that they voted conservative but really feel attached 
to Labour. This interpretation is highly plausible and widely accepted, al- 
though no systematic review of the proposition over a wider cross-national 
range of balloting conventions has to our knowledge been carried out. 
Variations in electoral history have also been invoked to account for 
other cross-national differences in patterns of psychological partisanship. It 
has been postulated, and spottily conIlrmed, that true partisan identifica- 
tions take extended periods of time to develop, and that patterns of identi- 
fication in new democratic systems should look quite different from those 
in mature systems (Converse, 1969). Perhaps most notably, data from an 
early sliee of time in a new system should show older voters less strongly 
identified with their parties than younger ones, or a direct reversal of the 
customary relationship. 
More recently, we have reported evidence that a similar reasoning ap- 
plies, at least in France, to newly emergent parties or formations whose 
names are frequently changed. In such systems, "standard" party identifica- 
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tion dynamics are much more clearly observed among identifiers of the few 
parties such as the Communists and Socialists that have been on the scene 
for several generations with essentially the same names. Similarly, we were 
able to demonstrate that in pockets of France, where only two main parties 
have been pitted against each other locally for many years, partisan dy- 
namics also resemble those of the two-party United States more closely 
(Converse and Pierce, 1986). Hence multiparty systems appear to breed 
somewhat different patterns of partisanship. And when, as in the French 
system, the complexity is increased by both brisk turnover and persistent 
renaming of" many of these competing parties, the same parsimonious the- 
ory would alert us to look for patterns of party attachment that lie between 
those of totally new party systems and those systems like the United States 
where the major parties have had nominal continuity for well over a cen- 
tury. 
Recently, several scholars have called attention to the fact that in foreign 
multiparty settings the dynamics of partisanship seem to resemble the 
American prototype more closely for the largest parties than for the smaller 
ones (Richardson, 1986; Barnes, 1990). Thus, for example, Barnes notes 
that in the Netherlands and West Germany of the later 1970s, strength of 
partisanship is, in the American style, positively correlated with age for the 
two major party groupings, but where other smaller parties are the objects 
of these loyalties, identification strength declines with the age of the voter. 
These are fertile observations and have an obvious bearing on the cross- 
national party identification riddle. Certainly if small parties evoke, for 
whatever reason, systematically different dynamics of partisan feeling than 
large ones~ it stands to reason that aggregate data on partisanship should 
look different from systems of many parties, most of which will be of neces- 
sity "minor," than from "two-party" systems, where there are typically no 
minor parties at all. 
At the same time, these observations do not in themselves account in 
any systematic way for why partisanship has different dynamics within ma- 
jor and minor parties. Actually, one such explanation lies close at hand. 
Although gross historical exceptions can be found, minor parties tend f~tr 
more often than not to be recent entrants in their party systems. Thus, fbr 
example, in the contrasts cited by Barnes (1990, p. 251), we can calculate 
the differences in "historical depth" of the implantation of what are coded 
as major and minor parties. Given that we are dealing with Dutch parties 
of enormously differing size, we have weighted the ages of the several par- 
ties by their levels of current support. When we do this, we find that the 
groupings considered to be "major" parties had on average been estab- 
lished parts of the Dutch political scene for about seventy years at the time 
the Barnes data began, whereas the "minor" parties had on average only 
PARTISANSHIP AND PARTY SYSTEM 243 
been organized fbr about twenty years, and thereby had intruded on the 
scene after a large fraetion of the electorate being surveyed had been so- 
cialized into voting within the system. The original theory of accumulating 
party loyalties would predict that in such a sequestered group of newer 
Duteh parties the age-partisanship relationship would still be negative, 
rather than the more familiar positive, just as is now reported. Thus what is 
important about minor parties may not be mainly that they are minor but 
that they are new? And more generally, sinee a proliferation of what are 
called minor parties is a monopoly of highly multiparty systems, and by 
definition eannot occur in mere two-party systems, we have a theoretical 
basis for expecting aggregate partisanship dynamics to differ significantly as 
a function of party system size. 
While these surmises are reasonable enough, our further investigations 
have been driven by a suspicion that greater party turnover is not the only 
source of divergent identification dynamics in multiparty systems. The 
sheer size of the party system in itself is likely to be an important factor. It 
surely has not been lost on many observers that the birthplace of "party 
identifieation theory" was in the smallest and most ancient competitive 
party system in the world, while the sharpest empirical challenge as to the 
generality of U.S. theories has come from the Netherlands, which has as 
large a party system as has existed in the world in the recent period. Just 
how large that party system is depends on definition, although it is symp- 
tomatic that the partisanship codes prepared for the Dutch election studies 
of the early 1970s have places for more than thirty parties or distinctive 
coalitions thereof. Surely we might expect the phenomena of psychological 
partisanship to differ somewhat between a two-party and a thirty-party sys- 
tem! 
For much of the remainder of this paper we shall consider in detail what 
tools we must have to pursue reliably in a cross-system format the implica- 
tions of party multiplicity for the dynamics of partisanship, since in a 
degree that is often ignored, conclusions in this context are distressingly 
affected by tool choice. 
Our first need is for a way to measure party system size by something 
more meaningful than sheer numbers of parties. Not only does such a sim- 
ple count become arbitrary in the fringe of minuscule formations but taken 
literally it can be positively misleading. Even when the two major U.S. 
parties are capturing well over 99 percent of the nation's votes, some defi- 
nitions would contend that the system still has five or more vote-receiving 
parties. Happily we can avoid such foolishness because Rae (1967) has pro- 
posed an excellent index of "party fractionalization" that takes account of 
both the size and the distribution of party strength (in popular votes, legis- 
lative seats, or whatever). We have adopted this index gratefully. 
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Rae's index pivots off the probability that two randomly selected voters 
(seats) will be of the same party. It takes a value of zero fractionalization 
when there is but a single monolithic party in a system and a value of one 
when every voter (seat) is a party unto itself. It is mainly moved, of course, 
by the number of parties in a system, but it is additionally affected by the 
relative size of those parties. Thus a system with two parties of equal size 
shows a higher index value (F = .500) than a two-party system in which 
one party has three times the strength of the other (F = .375). Similarly, a 
thirty-party system dominated by one party capturing half of the vote 
would rate as much less fractionalized than a system with thirty parties of 
equal strength. These are all highly desirable properties in talking about 
party system "size." Our investigations have not been limited to the one 
concept of fractionalization, although it is the central independent variable 
in much that we have done. 
Choosing analytic tools to quantify the crucial features of partisan change 
and constancy for our dependent variables turns out to be a much more 
complicated matter than is commonly understood. This is true because 
each of the major options in the traditional toolkit tends to color the im- 
pressions that we receive even fYom the same batch of partisanship data. A 
little thought makes clear that each traditional option commits us to a cer- 
tain model of the phenomenon we are hoping to compare across systems. 
In short, we are at a point where method and substance suffer strong inter- 
actions. In the sequence of our investigations, it has been important to 
understand the conceptual implications of our choice of methods as clearly 
as possible {~om the outset. 
THE INTERACTION OF METHOD AND SUBSTANCE 
Assessments of partisan dynamics always hinge in one way or another on 
the observed constancy of partisanship, be it constancy in profession of a 
loyalty, constancy in the vote for a party or, better yet, the interplay of the 
two. Constancy has in turn been assessed in virtually every one of the most 
influential items in the comparative literature on party identification in 
simple percentage terms (el., fbr example, Butler and Stokes, 1969). For a 
given party, the question is what percentage of those favoring the party at 
time-1 continue to favor it at time-2. 
This is a most natural reflex in treating two-party systems. However, the 
format has been casually extended to larger party systems (Thomassen, 
1976; Norpoth, 1978; LeDuc, 1981; Eijk and Niemoeller, 1983). Cross- 
system comparisons can be facilitated ff a single number can be found to 
summarize the stability of partisanship in a system between two points in 
time. The typical expression is the percent stable or "loyal," that is, who 
PARTISANSHIP AND PARTY SYSTEM 245 
repeat the same partisanship at both measurements. In an n-party system, 
this single number arises from the sum of the entries down the main diago- 
nal of the n = n turnover table for the partisanship measure. 
There is nothing intrinsically wrong about such a calculation, and under 
many circumstances it is exactly what we should want. However, like any 
mere measure, it obscures some things while clarifying others. In a degree 
not properly appreciated, it commits the analyst to a particular view of the 
substantive phenomenon of party change. 
There are alternative gauges of constancy. To take a familiar example, 
when we assess the constancy of party identification for individuals over 
time in the United States, we often start with positions on the conventional 
seven-point scale at two time points. From such data we can array a turn- 
over tabulation and count people on the main diagonal, which is the per- 
centage way, at the level of nominal measurement. Or we can view our 
measurements as an approximation to a continuous variable and move to 
assessments of constancy in the form of continuity correlations or regres- 
sion analyses. 
These procedures are analogous but not identical. Furthermore, they 
often give somewhat different subjective impressions. Continuity correla- 
tions for party identification in the U.S. case, which usually are over .8 for 
moderate time lapses, seem to soar toward a perfect value of 1.00, espe- 
cially if we keep in mind some inevitable fuzz of error, and therefore sound 
like a glass more than half full. The percentage calculation, which often 
emphasizes the proportion off the main diagonal (not giving exactly the 
same response twice), implies considerable change and thus may seem like 
a glass more than half empty. The main source of the differential impres- 
sion is of course that the correlation gives credit for some stability when 
change off the main diagonal is very slight, while the percentage mode 
treats such slight departures as equivalent to huge changes. 
It is an obvious impediment to the accumulation of knowledge if exactly 
the same underlying data can be presented in two reasonable alternate 
forms: one that impresses the reader with great stability and the other with 
great instability. 
We shall shortly argue that choices between these rival analysis formats 
must ultimately rest on the substance being investigated. There is one cir- 
cumstance, however, in which the correlational mode would seem intrin- 
sically superior. This is when we need to compare stability across variables 
measured at much different levels of fineness. Suppose, for example, that 
we wish to compare our partisan stability data based on the seven-point 
party identification scale with another partisanship measure, such as a dif- 
ference in the thermometer ratings given to Republicans and Democrats, 
which would likely show twenty or thirty distinct values rather than a mere 
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seven. If we proceed in a percentage way, the proportion on the main 
diagonal will be much smaller in the turnover table partitioned thirty ways 
than in the table partitioned seven ways. Correlational assessments are 
very nearly insensitive to such partitioning differences, however, if the 
lesser number of partitions is much more than a handful. 
All of which brings us face to face with the real problem troubling our 
specific investigation: Highly fractionalized systems will introduce many 
more partitions in our tabulations than will less fractionalized ones. If we 
proceed to make cross-system comparisons in the familiar percentage way, 
we become vulnerable to some very strong artifacts. 
We have constructed some artificial data in Figure 1 to convey just how 
strong these confounding influences may be. To prepare the figure we ran- 
domly sampled paired values from a bivariate normal distribution with a 
Pearsonian correlation of about .69. We chose this level because it is near 
the center of a zone familiar for certain types of partisanship continuity 
associations. 
We arrayed these paired observations in a scatter diagram. This scatter 
diagram we may think of as an "underlying situation" (continuous). We 
then introduced varying partitions to represent different degrees of party 
fractionalization. These partitions are of course hypothetical, although at 
points we have used party strength divisions from actual systems for a note 
of reality. Thus Figure I(C) is modeled after West German data of the early 
1970s; Figure I(D) is modeled from Dutch data of the same period, re- 
duced to the most substantial eleven parties in the systems. In both of these 
instances party size is conveyed by the size of the line segment occupied: 
The large parties are wide and the small parties are thinner. In Figure I(E) 
we have altered this construction assumption by making each one of the 
eleven parties equal in width. 
Once these partitions representing parties are entered, we carl retrieve 
from the diagrams some party cross-tabulations that permit us to proceed 
in the conventional percentage mode, gauging party constancy by the frac- 
tions of these populations falling on the main diagonals. And we find re- 
sounding "system differences": As party systems become more fraction- 
alized, the constancy of partisanship, gauged in percentages loyal~ declines 
precipitously. The most important point, however, is that by construction 
there are no system differences in the actual "underlying situation": Indi- 
viduals have exactly the same locations at both points in time in every 
panel. We emphasize this invariance in the bottom row of the figure by 
showing that identical continuity correlations are associated with each "sys- 
tem." 
We can also subject these pseudodata to other pseudoanalyses. As shown 
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between small and large parties. We find that for the most part they do 
differ and quite dramatically: Patrons of small parties show much less "'loy- 
alty" than do patrons of large parties, this being exactly the finding we 
noted had recently been reported from genuine party systems analyzed 
comparatively in a percentage mode (Richardson, 1987; Barnes, 1987). We 
remarked that this finding, treated substantively, might be no more than a 
special case of the original party identification theory, since small parties 
tend more often than not to be new ones for which deep attachments have 
not yet accumulated. On the other hand, the fact that strong differences in 
percentage constant appear even within our pseudodata raises the possi- 
bility that this result is method-dependent. Just why this difference arises, 
however, becomes clearer when we note that it does not appear in Figure 
I(E), where parties are designed to be equal in their "breadth," if not in 
the sizes of their followings. 
How general are the "pseudoresults" in Figure 1 otherwise? For exam- 
ple, we have modeled the underlying situation in Figure 1 as bivariate 
normal. Would we get analogous outcomes with other underlying popula- 
tion distributions? The answer is positive for the most part. To be sure, we 
could concoct tortured distributions that would generate other aggregate 
results if we concentrated large clusters of cases in certain boxes and left 
other boxes empty. But such deliberate "rigging" would be pointless and 
unfair. For a very large range of distributions, including all realistic ones, 
the effects we see would be essentially duplicated. This is true because as 
we partition a space more finely, the average number of elements per cate- 
gory or n-dimensional box has to decline accordingly. 
Indeed, it is because this is so elementary that Figure 1 belabors the 
obvious. The only reason we have bothered to "draw a diagram" is that the 
percentage naode of assessing party constancy is almost everywhere the 
method of choice; and in comparing systems tile method is usually em- 
ployed without any mention of any associated artifacts to be expected as we 
move from simple systems to highly t?actionalized ones. 
To recognize the severity of this problem does not, however, in itself 
provide any clear guidance as to which analysis format we should use for 
our investigations. For such guidance we must turn to a consideration of 
what each format is assuming more specifically about the substance of our 
party loyalty inquiry. 
Conceptual Stakes in Rival Analytic Models 
It is not hard to build a strong defense for the conventional percentage 
treatment of party change. After all, there is nothing in the original theory 
of party identification to suggest that the dynamics of identification with a 
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given party may differ according to what further parties there are in the 
system. The focus is on some single party and a person either belongs to it 
(by some specified criterion) or does not. Similarly, a member either re- 
mains loyal to this party or defects from it. The issue is the person's loca- 
tion with respect to the party boundary, a matter that is intrinsically di- 
chotomous and one for which percentage statements are ideal. 
From this viewpoint, treatment of political systems as continuous party 
spaces, while perhaps of gripping interest in its own right, requires elab- 
orate assumptions, many of which seem gratuitous. Such treatments are 
often vague about the defining character of the space, whether it be n 
dimensions of policy, voter likes and dislikes, or something else. Whatever 
the spaces are made of, it is not clear that voters consensually perceive 
party competition in any continuous space, although the use of continuous 
statistics presumes that they do. Worst of all, a continuous-space view leads 
directly away from what is central to the party loyalty problem, which is 
the boundary of the given party. The emphasis on the continuity of the 
space tends to fuzz out boundaries; and if we insist on laying out some 
boundaries within the space then we can only do so at the cost of further 
unexamined and perhaps unexaminable assumptions concerning how the 
space is carved into party regions, be it as a filnction of membership size as 
in Figures I(A-D), or in the equal-size blocs of Figure I(E), or in accord 
with any of a large number of other rival assumptions. In short, the contin- 
uous-space treatment costs a lot of strong assumptions and then merely 
distracts us from the core of our substantive problem. 
This argument carries a lot of truth. It fails, however, to come to grips 
with the potentially severe artifacts in making percentage comparisons 
across party systems of very different size, as represented by Figure 1. It is 
not clear how the percentage method could deal with the artifact beyond 
denying that it exists, on the substantive ground that party boundaries de- 
fining a zone of loyalty are absolute and invariant in their effects on partisan 
dynamics without regard to party size or the context defined by neighbor- 
ing parties. On the other hand, it is exactly this kind of invarianee that has 
been called into question by the early cross-national evidence. And if we 
can work our way to more reliable cross-system comparisons of these dy- 
namics, which the correlational mode offers, then perhaps we can get a 
better sense of where existing theory is oversimplified. 
Continuous-space statistics in effect equate systems for party- size, thereby 
providing ground for comparisons between systems. It is important, how- 
ever, to understand substantively just what assumption we are committing 
ourselves to at this point. In effect we assume that a system thirty parties 
"broad" is in some real sense no broader than a system with only two par- 
ties. This is equivalent to denying that the range of policy alternatives con- 
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sidered at some level in a thirty-party system is in some absolute sense 
fifteen times greater than in a two-party system; or that the dislike felt by 
some citizen at one extreme of the system toward a citizen at the other 
extreme is fifteen times more intense. It postulates that the breadth of such 
systems is about the same? 
Of course it is important to point out that actual party programs pre- 
sented to the public are likely to cover a much wider range of alternatives 
in a thirty-party system than in a two-party one. But this can naturally 
follow even if in all systems the range of discussed alternatives is essentially 
the same. That is, the most extreme political fringe in systems both large 
and small is advocating equally radical alternatives: The difference is that in 
a thirty-party system this fringe can be an actual party presenting a pro- 
gram, whereas in the two-party system the fringe is merely a weak pres- 
sure group at the far flank of one of the two parties. This is to say that while 
a tiny extreme-left splinter party in the Netherlands does indeed offer a 
more radical option to voters than does the Labour Party in Britain, its 
advocacies are not significantly different in their radicalness from those ad- 
vocated by the most extreme left fringe of the left wing of the Labour 
Party, and they are surely not in any sense five or ten times more radical 
than their Labour Party counterparts, in the way that would be implied by 
a doctrine that the range of political alternatives being conceived at any 
level in a system is a direct integral function of the number of parties in the 
system. 
This view of ultimate system equivalence is a "story" that can claim a lot 
of verisimilitude. We can use the same reasoning working from the voter 
end of the picture to tell an equally convincing "story" why partisan alle- 
giances might show different dynamics in a very large system than they do 
in a small two-party one. In effect, the interparty distances should be expe- 
rienced as being smaller and less forbidding in a very" large system than in a 
small one. For the voter preferring one of only two parties, the system has 
an aura of Manichean dualism: The world is divided into the good guys and 
the bad guys. Deserting the good guys in any general and permanent way 
is like being for sin. On the other hand, there is a sense of moral relativism 
that a very large system conveys with its many party options. There are 
always parties that are close neighbors, and the voter can do some roaming 
around a mere quadrant of the space without any feeling of selling his or 
her soul to the real devil twenty parties away. 
Thus on several counts the continuous vision of party spaces is a conge- 
nial one in addition to offering a useful solution to artifacts of comparison 
across systems of variable size. It does, as alleged, tend to blur our sense of 
party boundaries, or it alternatively requires us to make some rather arbi- 
trary assumptions as to where they are located. This is a potential cost, but  
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it has an easier solution than might appear, in the sense that with the 
continuous-space methods we can arrive at some interesting tests of the 
effects of parW boundaries, provided only that we are willing to keep them 
in mind, 
An Enlarged View of Partisan Dynamics 
We feel no obligation to decide that voters in multiparty- systems see its 
parties exclusively in either the continuous way or as mere nominal catego- 
ries. We feel that there is evidence to imagine that they see it both ways at 
once, although admittedly some individuals may be more sensitive to one 
perspective than the other. Indeed, conceptually (methods aside) we find 
that we can combine the two perspectives in what is quite an attractive 
enlargement of our view- of partisan dynamics in such systems. 
From this eombined perspective, voters do view these large systems in 
some degree as continuous spaces, which means among other things that 
voter motion across portions of these spaces fits simple "geographic mo- 
bility" rules such that short distances are traversed more readily and fre- 
quently than long ones or, in the terms of our substantive problem, near 
party alternatives are more attractive than distant ones. We state this as an 
assumption, but it is obviously a hypothesis that we can and shall test in 
the final section of this report. 
At the same time, parties themselves have some magnetic power as nom- 
inal categories so that voter migration in these spaces is additionally af- 
fected by where party boundaries fall. That is, parties in these spaces are 
like cells with membranes that are more or less permeable. These bound- 
aries can be passed through, but their existence creates some impedance, 
perhaps mild, slowing down the movement. 
Working with continuous-space assumptions we could in principle test a 
variety of interesting hypotheses about the dynamics of motion in these 
spaces. For example, using the proposition that interparty distances are in 
some sense important for behavior, we could hypothesize that movement 
between neighboring parties in large party systems is routinely greater 
than between the parties in a two-party system. On the other hand, if party 
boundaries have some impedance value, then we should find that motion 
over larger distances (thereby crossing multiple boundaries) should be less 
in large systems than over comparable distances in a two-party system with 
but one boundary to cross. 
Of course the original party identification theory might argue that only 
one set of boundaries exercises any significant impedance, that being the 
boundaries of the part 5' to which special loyalty is felt. It clearly should take 
some extra "escape velocity" fueled by political aggravation to decide to 
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depart from a party of identification completely. But once one has exited 
across the boundary of one's own prior party, then the crossing of other 
party boundaries may have no further effect beyond the standard minimiza- 
tion of distance traveled. 
In sum, if we take a combined view of the decision processes shaping the 
dynamics of partisanship, rather than arguing that one view or the other is 
the accurate one, we stimulate a variety of hypotheses that can help put the 
whole phenomenon of partisanship in more general perspective. 
Multidimensionality and Imperfect Information 
Let us briefly recognize two important complications that we have cho- 
sen to ignore in the early stages of our investigation. First, we are aware 
that party spaces in large systems often have some multidimensionality to 
them even in the minds of the voters (for an early investigation of the 
subject, see Converse, 1966a). This fact complicates things like the estab- 
lishment of distances traveled by voters through such systems. At the same 
time, there is evidence that most such large systems have one clear princi- 
pal dimension, whatever secondary ones may coexist with it. Therefbre as a 
first approximation we shall enjoy the simplification of thinking unidimen- 
sionally. 
The second problem involves imperfect information. It is not surprising 
that the continuous view of party spaces has been associated with rational 
models of political behavior. Such a view assumes vastly more information 
of the voter than is necessary for the nominal party model. A totally unin- 
volved voter who knows only that his family is Democratic and pays no 
other attention to polities can vote perfectly well in the United States. But 
the rationalist view" assumes that the voter is continually scanning party 
options to find the closest alternative. It implies that he or she knows much 
more about any single party than does our Democratic loyalist; and if there 
are thirty parties in the system, it is clear that he or she must technically 
have orders of magnitude more of political information than the inattentive 
loyalist. 
As is well known, we can expect to find some voters in every system, 
however large and complicated it may be, who know their system in high 
detail and with deadly accuracy. As is equally well known, such voters are 
usually a very small percentage of their electorates; and where party sys- 
tems are truly large and complex, there are large fractions of the electorate 
for whom a modest phrase like "imperfect information" is quite charitable. 
We have elsewhere done a detailed empirical charting of the distribution of 
knowledge about the complex French party system in its electorate (Con- 
verse and Pierce, 1986). At the level of recall, many French voters cognize 
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the system as little more than a three-party one, although those who eog- 
nized but three of eleven or so parties active at the time did tend to be 
aware of major alternatives rather than three neighboring parties in a single 
quadrant of the party space. However, knowledge of additional parties is 
thin and scattered, meaning that the party space can be quite idiosyn- 
eratieally "deformed" in its shape, relative to the perfeet information coun- 
terpart. 
Nonetheless, it has been our strategy to proceed as far as we ean ignor- 
ing the problem of heterogeneous information. 
TESTING THE CONTINUOUS-SPACE ASSUMPTION 
We have now laid out the conceptual infrastructure for our investigation 
and discussed its interaction with our ehoiee of analytie tools. Our final task 
in the first stage is to verify the generality of the key assumption that voters 
in multiparty systems tend to see them in reasonable degree as continuous 
spaees. In a sense the verifieation is trifling, sinee mounds of confirming if 
not well-systematized evidence are extant. On the other hand, the tests are 
worth reporting here, since they generated eertain serendipitous discov- 
eries on the side that have had impact on our subsequent work. 
More speeifieally, our hypothesis is that voters in systems with more 
than two parties give evidence of seeing other parties than their own first 
preference as located at varying political "distances" from themselves and 
that the voters respond to these further parties affeetively as a strong func- 
tion of these distances. 
We began by loeating those single studies within each of our multiparty 
systems that eontained measures of (1) self-location on a left-right scale; (2) 
perceived left-right locations reported for each major party in the system; 
and (3) feelings of individual voters toward each of these parties. We then 
proeeeded to cheek the hypothesis on aggregated data in the following fash- 
ion. First, it is known that there is a good deal of scatter in voter percep- 
tions of the left-right positions of given parties in such systems, presumably 
due to imperfeet information. On the other hand, it is also known that the 
total sample means of these attributions, party by party, bear a close re- 
semblance to the mueh more eonsensual, or less scattered, loeations given 
the same parties by knowledgeable elite observers. Therefore we took the 
means of these pereeived locations over each system sample as a fixed and 
semiohjeetive measure of party locations, permitting us to say how distant 
in unidimensional terms each party was from every other. 
Then for the sympathizers of each party in the system we took the mean 
affect reported toward each major party, including one's own party? This 
produeed a square matrix of affect means between all parties. This matrix 
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was not symmetric because partisans of Party A could have different aggre- 
gate feelings toward Party B than were reciprocated from B to A. We chose 
to leave this source of variability in the analysis and simply regressed all 
averages for interparty feelings on interparty distances. Since warm feel- 
ings were keyed to larger values, our hypothesis called for an inverse rela- 
tionship between distance and affect. It is not necessarily true that we 
would get a linear eovariation between these two scalings, although the 
sizes of intercorrelations can in this context be taken as indicators of good- 
ness of fit to the simplest linear model. 
The basic output over the several tests run in this aggregated form is 
summarized in Table 1. Within each of our multiparty systems there are 
towering relationships between continuous gradations of felt distance and 
gradations of affect. The tightness of these relationships varies with system 
size in a way that might well be predicted on methodological grounds 
alone, although it is also plausible that there may be higher dimensionality 
and more anomalies of mutual perception in very fractionalized systems. 
That is, the three highest relationships out of nine estimated, actually ap- 
proaching r = - 1.00, all occur in the four-party German system, whereas 
the three lowest relationships all occur in the Dutch data. 
In any event, the main message of Table 1 is loud and clear: Voters in 
these systems do see parties as differentially placed in some kind of contin- 
TABLE 1. The Party Distance/Affect Relationship in Four European 
Multiparty Systems 
Effective N of 
Study N of Party Paired 




France 1967 831 6 36 - .72  - .87  
W. Germany 1976-1 1,607 4 16 - 1.09 - .96  
1976-2 1,250 4 16 - .97  - .97  
1976-3 977 4 16 - .98  - .98  
Netherlands 1.970 1,291 I0 100 - .63  - .81 
1971 798 8 64 - ,67  - .74  
1972 572 10 100 - ,69  - .81  
Norway 1981 534 7 49 - 1.13 - ,83  
1985 488 7 49 - 1.00 - .86  
*Although regressions rest on aggregated data and each respondent contributes multiple 
affect values, these entries provide an approximate number of independent individual contri- 
butions to the aggregate solution. 
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uous space in ways that bear directly on their own gradations of liking and 
disliking the relevant party objects. It should be kept in mind the correla- 
tions are as high as they are in part because of the degree of aggregation to 
party-level data that we imposed as a shortcut on what was expected to be a 
rather routine demonstration. In fact we have looked at the version of the 
distance-affect relationship with the affect term disaggregated to the indi- 
vidual level in a few instances: For France, the aggregate r of - . 8 7  re- 
duces to an individual r of - . 5 4 ;  and for the Netherlands in 1970, the 
value of - . 8 1  reduces to - . 51 .  These reductions are suggestive of some of 
the idiosyncratie variability in information and perception that our aggrega- 
tion drives ont. But it would be hard to view the data in either form and 
still claim that our use of continuous spaces in formulating our hypothetical 
Figure 1 is far-fetched or unwarranted. 
Once past the routine test, some unexpected further results emerge from 
the same analysis. With distance-affect correlations already in t h e .  80s and 
.90s, it is tempting to assume that most variance remaining unaccounted 
for in affect can be little but measurement error. We rapidly discover, 
however, that this is very far from the case. Since we are dealing with 
repeated panel waves in all countries of Table 1 save France, we can take 
residuals from the simple linear regression of affect on distance at more 
than one time }br a given country and compare them. We find them 
strongly correlated. 
In the West German case, for example, very- little of the original variance 
in aggregated affect is left unaccounted for by the simple distance variation: 
only 7.6 percent  of it for Wave I, 5.3 percent  for Wave II, and 3.8 percent 
for Wave III. Yet these very sparse residuals are still correlated at r = .58 
between Waves I and II, and at .70 between Waves II and III. The corre- 
sponding coefl[lcients for the Netherlands are .71 and .67, respectively. 
And the correlation of residuals for the two Norwegian waves is r = .88! 
These residuals are obviously no mere remainder of error noise and they 
deserve more systematic study. 
Since characteristic high or low residuals are linked repeatedly to specific 
party pairs (one partisan group as subject, reacting to another party as ob- 
ject) in these systems, it is easy to detect what the additional sources of 
variance are. Some were foreseen. For example, in the Dutch case, reli- 
gious division adds a second dimension impinging on expressions of affect. 
Partisans of Protestant parties tend to take a dimmer view of Catholic par- 
ties (and vice versa) than the simple linear left-right model predicts. This 
secondary effect is, however, much weaker than expected: It is, in fact, 
barely more than discernible. 
Two strong departures from linearity are reflected in these residuals. 
These include (1) a substantial bonus of positive affect for one's own party 
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and (2) a preference for large parties over small ones. Both effects have an 
important bearing on the argument we have been developing. 
The first bonus is very clear in any scatter diagram of the distance-affect 
relationship. For the most part affect toward parties other than one's own 
defines a pretty clear line in these systems, as the strong correlations of 
Table 1 imply. But if this neat line based on assessments of all other parties 
is extended to the intercept representing a distance of zero, or an imputed 
affect for one's own party, then it turns out routinely that such an extrapo- 
lation understates the warmth of feeling actually reported by voters for 
their own parties. People like their own parties much more than their out- 
party feelings would suggest. 
By reestimating our regression with own-party distance and affect set 
aside, we can isolate just how large this bonus of affect is, especially where 
we have more data points than for the small-N German case. For France it 
is about 17 points, for the Netherlands about 24 points, and for Norway 
about 28 points. The relative magnitudes here are evocative, since the lit- 
erature based on more direct measurements suggests that party identifica- 
tions are rather dilute in the aggregate in France and are on the strong side 
for Norway. The absolute magnitudes are equally impressive, in view of 
the fact that the predictions for affect toward other parties empirically 
cover only about a 50-point range in these systems. Thus the bonuses are 
running one-third to one-half of that range. Since these bonuses appear for 
all "own" parties from system to system, it becomes less surprising that the 
residuals from the simple linear analysis show such strong intercorrelations 
over time within each system. 
The bonus that registers in this continuous-space analysis also calls into 
question the concern associated with a preference for nominal measure- 
ment, to the effect that a continuous-space mode risks ignoring the crucial 
boundaries that set one's party off from others in the system. The bonus 
seems to be an excellent way of expressing the special "grip" of party iden- 
tification. It conveys neatly the greater escape velocity of disenchantment 
that may be required to move out of one's chosen party than to shop freely 
across alternative parties once the escape has taken place. 
The second repetitive departure from linearity is not nearly as marked as 
the first bonus effect. However, in all systems there is a clear tendency for 
voters to react more {hvorably to the largest system parties than toward the 
smallest, with basic distance controlled. Thus, for example, residuals left 
after the distance-affect analysis are correlated (r) with party size (as in- 
dexed by voting strength) at levels of .67, .72, and .54 in the three Dutch 
waves, at .50 and .65 for Norway, and at ,91 in the sole trial for France. 
It should be remembered that these lavish correlations have been 
formed from highly aggregated mean data and rest on only six to ten paired 
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values, with outlying values not excluded. But they offer further reason for 
the fact that the minimal residuals from our sturdy linear solutions show 
such strong cross-time correlations within each system. Stably large party 
objects persistently show positive residuals and the tiny parties show nega- 
tive ones. 
This link between our residuals and party size has a final implication for 
our diseussion. In an earlier section we pointed out that with other things 
equal, voters should show more interparty change in highly fractionalized 
systems than in smaller ones, although the grounds are entirely artifactual. 
Due to the same artifacts, it could be inferred that other things equal, 
voter turnover should be proportionally larger for smaller parties than for 
large ones. The reasoning here is impeccable, and the eaution is an impor- 
tant one. 
On the other hand, the analysis of residuals suggests that voters tend to 
deprecate small parties at levels over and above the negative feelings that 
naturally intensify as perceived political distances increase. In principle we 
might be able to deduee from the data in hand whether this surplus of 
negativism is associated with the size of these parties or with their novelty. 
In practice this is difficult because of analytic instabilities associated with 
fairly strong eollinearity between party size and party novelty, combined 
with our very limited number of relevant well-fraetionalized systems. Pit- 
ting party size against party age in predicting the residuals would lead to a 
clear conclusion for the Netherlands that size dominates the relationship 
and age is irrelevant. For Norway, the same test suggests a more even 
balance, with age being slightly more important than size. However, these 
results are mixed and unstable because they tend to hinge on the residual 
affect felt toward a single anomalous party in the system, such as one that is 
small but old. 
In the long run, with many more systems drawn into the analysis, a more 
reliable critical test might be mounted. But it is at least clear at this stage 
that the systematic disfavoring of small parties, resting as it does on voter 
sentiments, cannot be written off as any statistical artifact of the type that 
might infest turnover tables bearing on party continuity and change. 
SUMMARY 
Our investigation is motivated by an interest in the way the size of party 
systems may affect the dynamics of individual party identifications that take 
place within them, thereby accounting for cross-national variations in their 
observed properties. In the work reported here we have considered how 
the choice of analytic method can affect apparent results, especially in 
working across systems that dittbr greatly in their party fractionalization. 
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Although most  past  work on the dynamics  of par t i sanship  has used  d iscre te-  
space pe rcen tage  statistics, some p rob lems  are be t t e r  addres sed  in large 
par ty  systems with  analyses that  p r e sume  voters  see the i r  systems in rea- 
sonable deg ree  as cont inuous  spaces. 
W e  have ske tched  a handsome  confi rmat ion of this assumpt ion  while  
demons t r a t ing  that  cont inuous-space  p rocedure s  can cap ture  and isolate 
the  k ind  of  affect bonus  that  objectif ies the  special  loyalty accorded  to the  
voter ' s  p r e fe r r ed  party.  The same p rocedure s  also cast fur ther  l ight  on the  
issue of  l imi ted  loyalt ies  to minor  part ies .  Whi l e  it may be  expec ted  that  
traffic into and out  of small  par t ies  may be  more  in tense  than that  for large 
par t ies  on s t ructura l  grounds  alone,  the  same analyt ic  p rocedure s  showed a 
t e n d e n c y  of voters  to feel an edge  of  negat iv ism about  minor  par t ies  even 
after par ty  d is tance  is control led.  
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NOTES 
1. In most countries where history and measurement have permitted a test, for example, it 
seems that newly proposed parties are disproportionately attractive to younger voters, and 
are so even in the subset of cases in which such parties pitch their appeals to older voters 
and traditional values (as with George Wallace's third-party effort in 1968). These nonob- 
vious behavioral predictions from party identification theory as developed in the United 
States usually seem to work even in systems where scholars are unable to replicate some of 
the simpler properties of the measurement. 
2. Although our series of investigations invokes a slightly broader set of studies, the empirical 
data in this report came from four studies. Two were supplied by the ICPSR, including (1) 
the German Election Panel Study of 1976 (Zentralarchiv Nos. 823, 89-,4, and 825--ICPSR 
No. 7513) and (2) the Dutch Election Study of 1970-73 (ICPSR Study Number 7261). The 
French Election Study of 1967-69 is the same as reported in Converse and Pierce (1986). 
The Norwegian study of 1981-85 is described in our initial acknowledgments. 
3. In a paper yet to be published, which we discovered only as this report was in its final 
revision, Richardson (1991) argues that European party loyalties are most stable and similar 
in their dynamics to their American counterparts among adherents of traditional European 
"cleavage" parties, usually class-based ones. He also shows convincingly that these more 
stable loyalties are buttressed by fuller cognitive party images and higher levels of hostility 
felt toward the party on the other side of the cleavage. This is most useful in clarifying the 
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intervening states that condition partisan dynamics. On the other hand, these cleavage 
parties also tend to be both old and large. It is not surprising that richer and more consis- 
tent cognitive images have accrued for parties that have been the most prominent in na- 
tional politics for the longest period of time. Given the natural collinearities here, it will 
not be easy for any of us to tease apart effects associated jointly with age, size, and cleav- 
age-issue programmatic bases. 
4. This postulate ignores the Richardson (1986) finding that "out-party hostility" is markedly 
greater, as measured on thermometer-type scales, in multiparty systems than in the 
United States. Possibly our next paragraph offers some explanations why this might be so, 
without subscribing to a more general proposition that larger party systems are also 
broader psychologically to the voter. 
5. We could not deal with every party in extremely fractionalized systems in these terms. 
That is, while the Dutch system in this period was technically a system of thirty parties or 
more, two-thirds of these groupings had so few partisans in a limited survey sample (less 
than ten) that they do not generate stable affect means. Therefore the Dutch sample was 
treated for this one purpose as a ten-party system (or eight in the middle wave), the 
Norwegian case as a seven-party system, and the French case as a six-party system. 
